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Terrorist Exploitation of the International Legal System

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An Intelligence Assessment

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An Intelligence Assessment

This assessment was prepared by
Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Terrorist Groups Branch, OGI,

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This assessment was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.

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Key Judgments

Information available as of 1 March 1983 was used in this paper.

In recent years, terrorist groups have sought to exploit the international legal system both for propaganda purposes and for securing release or better treatment for their captured members. Although government officials fear that even limited terrorist success in the legal arena could establish precedents that would give such groups significant legal, political, and operational advantages, we believe such concerns generally are overdrawn. Nevertheless, terrorist groups that have had some success are likely to increase and refine their use of these tactics, and other groups are likely to emulate them.

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Although democratic states rely heavily on extradition to bring international terrorists to trial, such efforts often run afoul of traditions of political asylum and considerations of national sovereignty which the defendants are able to exploit. The legal defense most often used by terrorists to avoid extradition is the "political offense exception"—a standard provision in extradition agreements that rules out extradition for an offense deemed to be essentially political.

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Another defense used by terrorists is to claim prisoner-of-war status under the terms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols. Such status provides immunity for acts that normally are considered common crimes but are permissible in time of war as long as they conform to the customary laws of war. Claims to POW status have been used more successfully as a propaganda issue than as a legal defense.

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In response to the terrorist threat, the international community has enacted a series of conventions and agreements. Although these accords often lack sufficient sanctions to compel compliance, they do place states on record as being prepared to take certain measures in response to terrorism and thus can be used to publicize a signatory country's noncompliance. An exception is the 1978 Bonn Antihijacking Declaration, which by providing severe, specific sanctions demonstrates that nations can agree on, and will take, effective legal action when they believe their vital interests are threatened. Generally, however, more effective legal remedies have been taken at the national level. By limiting, in specific circumstances, constitutional guarantees—such as freedom of speech, association, and movement—and by restricting access to counsel, bail, and speedy trial, such legislation makes the operational climate less hospitable for the terrorist.

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

French liberal asylum policy and tolerance of terrorist groups result in increasing bloodshed, such as car bomb in Rue Marbeuf that killed one and injured 63.

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Terrorist Exploitation of the International Legal System

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By adroit use of the legal system, captured terrorists are sometimes able to gain a degree of recognition—even legitimacy—that they could never win in open battle. Even if the terrorist fails to win his freedom—and this is usually the case—exploitation of the legal system enables him to publicize his struggle while in custody. This study examines the primary legal defenses used by terrorist groups and the efforts of governments to counter these defenses.

The Political Offense Exception

Most extradition treaties contain a political offense exception, which is intended to differentiate political dissidents from common criminals and to protect the former from being forcibly returned to the country of their alleged crime. Although political terrorism does not fall clearly into the category of political activity envisioned by the framers of most such treaties, neither is it explicitly excluded. Prominent terrorist groups that have attempted to take advantage of the political offense exception include the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), both wings of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), the West German Red Army Faction (RAF), and the Italian Red Brigades (table 1).

In modern practice, the political offense exception is based on two landmark British cases: the Castioni decision of 1891 and the Meunier decision of 1894.[1] These decisions established that a common crime could be considered political and nonextraditable if it were an integral part of an act committed to further political objectives and aimed at the institutions of the regime rather than at the general public. In addition, a judicial consensus among the legal establishments of Western nations maintains that proportionality must exist between the violence employed and the anticipated political gain.

[1] The Castioni and Meunier decisions form the basis for the American judiciary's view of the political offense exception. Practices vary from country to country, but in Europe the Belgians, Dutch, and in particular, the French have adopted a more liberal interpretation of these landmark cases.

The political offense argument has been used to best effect when the country requesting extradition is perceived to be repressive and when sympathizer groups mobilize popular support on behalf of the defendant. Customarily, for an extradition request to receive serious consideration, the alleged offense must be regarded as a crime by the country to which the request is made and the penalties in the two countries must be similar.

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International efforts to counter use of the political exception by terrorists have been impeded by the lack of an agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a "political offense." Many states are reluctant to subscribe to any definition that might abridge national sovereignty by limiting their right to determine whether or not an offense is extraditable. The French, for example, attach particular importance to their tradition of political asylum—"the sacred principle" of foreign relations—and strongly resist efforts by the European Community to narrow the political offense loophole.

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A case that illustrates the extent to which political interests can drive extradition policy involved Rolfe Pohle, an RAF arms procurer and one of five terrorists freed from West German jails in exchange for kidnaped Berlin mayoral candidate Peter Lorenz. Arrested in Athens, Pohle fought German extradition efforts by pleading the political offense exception.

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Table 1
Political Offense Exception: Key Terrorist Extradition Cases

Requested by/ Requested of	Incident	Group	Outcome
West Germany/Greece	Pohle case (1976). Freed from a German jail in return for a kidnaped Berlin mayoral candidate, Pohle fled to Greece where he was arrested.	RAF	Extradition affirmed. An Athens court denied extradition on grounds that act constituted a political offense; after the German Government exerted extremely heavy pressure on the Greek Government, the Greek Supreme Court reversed the decision.
West Germany/France	Croissant case (1977). Charged with providing operational support to the RAF, Croissant fled to France and requested political asylum.	RAF	Extradition affirmed. A French court rejected initial German warrant on grounds that charges cited were political and honored only one of 15 charges in second warrant. Croissant became a *cause celebre* among French Leftists and an embarrassment to President Giscard.
West Germany, Israel/France	Abu Daoud case (1977). Organizer of the 1972 attack against the Israeli Olympic team, Daoud was arrested by French authorities in 1977.	Black September (PLO)	Extradition denied. The French Government under heavy Arab pressure denied extradition on grounds that the German warrant was technically defective and had not been followed by an official request through diplomatic channels. The Israeli request was denied on grounds that the offense had not taken place on French soil and therefore the Franco-Israeli extradition agreement did not apply.
West Germany/ Netherlands	Folkerts case (1978). Germany requested extradition for crimes including the murder of German industrialist, Hanns-Martin Schleyer.	RAF	Extradition affirmed. The Dutch Supreme Court denied extradition for Schleyer murder on political offense grounds. Folkerts was ultimately extradited on other charges, but court finding alarmed both German and Dutch officials as it placed the Dutch Government in the position of appearing to sanction political murder.
Italy/France	Piperno case (1979). Extradition requested for complicity in the kidnaping and murder of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro.	Red Brigades	Extradition affirmed. The French court rejected the initial Italian warrant on grounds that the cited offenses were political but ultimately honored two of the 46 charges listed in a second warrant. Piperno was returned to Italy where the Italian court released him for lack of evidence.
Great Britain/United States	McMullen case (1979). Great Britain requested extradition for the bombing of British Army barracks in England.	PIRA	Extradition denied. A US court determined that McMullen's acts constituted a political offense. The court agreed with defense argument that an insurrection of a political nature existed in Northern Ireland and that the British Army and its military facilities were legitimate targets.
Great Britain/United States	Mackin case (1980). Great Britain requested extradition for wounding a British soldier in Belfast.	PIRA	Extradition denied. A US court determined that Mackin's act constituted a political offense, and the court commented favorably on the legitimacy of the PIRA efforts.

Table 1 (continued)

Requested by/ Requested of	Incident	Group	Outcome
Spain/France	Linaza case (1981). Spain requested extradition for the murder of six Civil Guard members, assassination of a municipal councilor, and the bombing of Spain's nuclear facility near Milano.	ETA-M	Extradition denied. A French court, for the first time since the death of Franco (1975), ruled to extradite an ETA member, but President Mitterrand, by refusing to return Linaza, fulfilled an election pledge to the Linaza family and the French Basque population that no ETA member would be extradited.
Israel/United States	Abu Eain case (1981). Israel requested extradition for a bombing that killed two and wounded 36 in a Tiberius market square.	PLO	Extradition affirmed. Political offense exception argument was not accepted by the court because the act was clearly directed against the civilian populace and not the installations of the Israeli Government.
Great Britain/United States	Quinn case (1982). Extradition requested for the murder of a British constable.	PIRA	Extradition affirmed. For the first time a US court found for extraditing an Irish militant. The decision, however, must be reviewed by the District Court and then may be appealed to Circuit Court and ultimately to the US Supreme Court.
Italy/Canada	Piperno case (1982). Extradition requested for supporting Red Brigade activities and complicity in the Moro and other murders.	Red Brigades	Extradition denied. A Canadian court rejected three separate Italian extradition requests citing political offense exception and technical legal considerations.

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According to the press, the French Government had been subjected to heavy Arab pressure and feared that strong action would invite oil supply problems or terrorist reprisals.

In another case involving West German interests, however, the terrorist was the beneficiary of successful political pressure. Black September member Abu Daoud, who was wanted for organizing the attack against the Israeli Olympic team during the 1972 Munich games, was arrested when he illegally entered France in 1977. The French court rejected both West German and Israeli efforts to obtain custody and released Daoud on narrow and dubious legal grounds.

Terrorist Successes and Failures. Of all European terrorist groups, Spain's ETA has been most successful in avoiding extradition. Using France as a safe haven, both the Military Wing (ETA/M) and the Political Military Wing (ETA/PM) have exploited the French Government's tradition of political asylum, its liberal interpretation of the political offense exception, and its desire to placate the French Basque minority. Since 1975, the French Government has honored none of the more than 20 Spanish requests for the extradition of ETA fugitives. French recalcitrance, we believe, is reinforced by an historic enmity

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toward Spain and a particular distaste for the Spanish security forces, which are regarded as holdovers from the Franco regime. Spain has no effective leverage and is dependent on French good will if it is to attain other foreign policy objectives, such as entry into the European Community.

Although not as successful as the ETA in the narrowly legal sense, Northern Ireland's PIRA has made sophisticated use of the political offense exception. By mounting well-coordinated, large-scale media and political action campaigns in Ireland and abroad, the PIRA has been able to rally support, increase recruitment, raise funds, and generate sympathetic publicity. Often PIRA fugitives flee to the United States which, according to the Department of Justice, has never extradited an Irish republican militant. An encouraging development occurred in September 1982, however, when a US federal magistrate found for extradition in the case of William Quinn, wanted by the British Government for the murder of a British constable. The decision still faces a review and appeals process that could extend to the US Supreme Court.

Earlier key PIRA decisions involved the Peter McMullen (1979) and Desmond Mackin (1980) cases, in which US courts denied extradition on grounds that the acts constituted political offenses. The court agreed with defense arguments that a state of political insurrection existed in Northern Ireland and that the British Army and its military facilities were legitimate PIRA targets—findings that were exploited by PIRA propagandists.

West Germany's RAF has been involved in several highly publicized extradition cases but has not been successful in preventing extradition. In some instances, however, RAF sympathizer groups have generated considerable, favorable publicity.

The Red Brigades have made less use of the political offense exception than most other major terrorist groups, largely because they are involved in fewer extradition cases. Also, since the Italian political system is widely perceived by West Europeans as accommodating a diversity of views, the credibility of such a defense is reduced. However, the political offense exception has impeded repeated efforts by the Italian Government to bring to justice Franco Piperno, alleged mastermind of the Aldo Moro murder. In 1979 after a lengthy extradition hearing in France, Piperno was returned to Italy but was acquitted by an Italian court for insufficient evidence. The government again sought to apprehend Piperno in 1982, but this time a Canadian court denied extradition on grounds of the political offense exception and technical legal considerations.

Franco Piperno

POW Status and the Geneva Conventions

Some captured terrorists have demanded that they be accorded prisoner-of-war status under the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols. Such status provides significant advantage to a captured terrorist because, according to the laws and customs of war, a combatant is afforded immunity for acts that in time of peace are considered common crimes. Moreover, inherent in the granting of POW status is the implication that the terrorist group, by being treated as an army at war, has achieved a degree of political legitimacy

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"[The killing] of Aldo Moro is an act of revolutionary justice—the highest act of humanity possible in a class divided society." Renato Curcio, Red Brigade leader.

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RAF lawyer Klaus Croissant (in rear seat), an architect of the POW defense and himself a principal in an extradition battle, photographed accompanying Jean-Paul Sartre to visit Andreas Baader in Stammheim Prison. Driver is Hans-Joachim Klein, who was wounded in 1975 attack on OPEC Headquarters led by "Carlos."

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Although governments are loath to grant formal POW status to captured terrorists, they have accorded POW protection in cases when terrorism assumes the proportions of a general insurgency, in the hope that doing so would foster humane treatment of captured government soldiers. Such situations, while not common, have been documented in some 10 internal conflicts since the mid-1950s. During the Vietnam war, for instance, the United States and South Vietnam accorded captured Viet Cong POW treatment; from 1972 to 1976, the British granted Irish terrorists a special status that afforded many of the same guarantees.

Terrorist Successes and Failures. Terrorist claims to POW status have been more successful as a propaganda weapon than as a courtroom tactic. Irish Republican militants, for example, claimed POW status early in their struggle (1916-20) and have continued to use the issue not so much as a legal defense but as a means to obtain political recognition. Although the British Government has generally refused to recognize these claims, the militants continue to exploit the issue with the public, using the terms POW status, political status, and special status interchangeably. The Provisional Sinn Fein, the political arm of the PIRA, established a POW department to marshal international support during 1980-81 for the hunger strikers demanding special status. Although the strikers' demands were not met, it was generally acknowledged by terrorism experts that the strike had provided short-term but significant political and organizational gains to the PIRA.

The RAF of West Germany also has had some success in using the POW ploy as a propaganda weapon. In February 1981, nine imprisoned RAF terrorists began a hunger strike to demand POW status. This strike quickly spread to other prisons in West Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Supporters and sympathizer groups mounted a Europe-wide campaign and filed petitions with the United Nations



Representatives of the American Indian Movement march in Belfast in support of the hunger strikers.

Human Rights Commission. The West German Government did not grant POW status, but press reporting suggests that the campaign fed anti-German sentiment among European leftwing intellectuals and others predisposed to believe the worst about German treatment of political dissenters.

Members of other terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) have also claimed POW status on occasion. Red Brigade members arrested after the kidnaping of General Dozier in December 1981 identified themselves as prisoners of war, in contrast to previously arrested Brigadists who claimed to be political prisoners. The latter approach having failed, these terrorists may have decided that the POW issue, because of the specific guarantees accorded by the Geneva Conventions, offers greater leverage. To our knowledge, the claim has not influenced the government in its treatment of Brigade members—probably because authorities perceive that granting such status would be tantamount to acknowledging the Brigades as a legitimate political force.

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In Dublin an estimated 12,000 hunger strike sympathizers protest British policy.

ASALA's demands that its captured members receive political status and treatment as prisoners of war have not been upheld in the courts. ASALA efforts to exploit the issue as propaganda have been primitive—preaching to the converted rather than expanding the organization's appeal beyond those already committed to the cause. ASALA relies on intimidation rather than political manipulation of the judicial process to secure release or better treatment for its captured members. However, because the group's demands have been met at times, the uninformed public could infer that claims to special treatment by ASALA terrorists have some validity.

We believe that the POW defense, like the political offense exception, is used to best effect by ethnic separatists because such groups often can persuasively point to a history of serious grievances, documented government repression, organized armed resistance to the central authority, and a base of popular support. Basque and Irish separatists thus can make a more compelling case than an anarchic group such as the German Red Army Faction. Traditional Marxist groups probably occupy a middle ground with regard to their ability to exploit such legal defenses effectively.

In contrast to the political offense exception, which is limited to situations involving extradition, claims to POW status have a much wider application. However, as a legal defense, such claims are less likely to succeed, primarily because POW status is granted by the victim government whereas political offense exception requests are determined by a third party usually not directly involved in the matter. The success of either approach largely depends on the interests of the government holding the terrorist, the integrity of the judiciary, the capabilities of sympathizer groups to manipulate public opinion, and the nature of the crime itself. 25X1

International Legal Efforts—Often Flawed

In response to the terrorist threat, the international community has enacted a series of conventions, declarations, and agreements dealing with the problems posed by aircraft hijackings, extradition, threats to internationally protected persons, and the taking of hostages. 25X1 25X1

More than any other act, aircraft hijacking has mobilized the international community (table 2). Under the aegis of the International Civil Aviation Organization, three international conventions have been adopted—the 1963 Tokyo Convention, the 1970 Hague Convention, and the 1971 Montreal Convention. These conventions provide a legal framework for dealing with attacks against civil aviation, but none mandates sanctions strong enough to force a state to comply. In 1978 a major step was taken to rectify this weakness when a declaration was formulated and signed in Bonn by the heads of state of the Seven Summit Countries.[2] This declaration provides for a cutoff of services by the airlines of the signatory states to any country refusing to return a hijacked aircraft or failing to extradite or prosecute an aircraft hijacker. 25X1 25X1

The effect of such accords is difficult to gauge. A precipitous drop in skyjacking occurred in 1973—when the number of offenses fell to less than half the 1969-70 high—after the three conventions but some

[2] Canada, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany. 25X1

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Table 2
Antiskyjacking Agreements

Agreement	Key Provisions	Remarks
Tokyo Convention (1963)	Clarifies jurisdiction over alleged offender. Provides legal principles for dealing with offenses committed aboard an aircraft. Provides for return of skyjacked aircraft to owners.	Although this convention provides no effective means to bring a skyjacker to justice, it established a precedent for multilateral action.
The Hague Convention (1970)	Requires a contracting state to prosecute or extradite an alleged offender and impose "severe" but unspecified penalties.	Established universal jurisdiction for skyjacking, thereby allowing any country holding an alleged skyjacker to try him, but did not establish priority of jurisdiction in event of competing claims nor deal with a hijacking initiated or attempted before takeoff or after landing.
Montreal Convention (1971)	Extends provisions of The Hague Convention to sabotage and attacks against airports, navigation facilities, and aircraft on the ground.	Employs The Hague extradite-or-prosecute formula, but leaves the determination of "severe" penalties to the state holding the fugitives, thereby providing a loophole that enables a state to fulfill the letter but not the spirit of the agreement.
Bonn Declaration (1978)	Asserts that when a country refuses to extradite or prosecute an aircraft hijacker or to return the hijacked aircraft, the airlines of the Seven Summit Countries will halt service to the offending state.	Since the airlines of the signatory states carry an estimated two-thirds of the non-Communist world's air passenger traffic, the Bonn Declaration provides the means to effectively punish countries that violate the antiskyjacking conventions.

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five years before the Bonn Declaration.[3] Open source literature ascribes the marked decrease to improved airport security, lessening publicity value, and an antiskyjacking agreement in 1973 with Cuba. A PLO declaration in 1975 that skyjacking would be treated as a crime served as a further deterrent.

Other international agreements that deal with international terrorism are also flawed. For example, both the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and the 1979 UN Convention Against the Taking of Hostages permit a state to deny extradition if an act is judged to be a political offense. In general, international agreements designed to counter the terrorist threat lack strong, effective sanctions and contain loopholes that enable signatory states to evade the spirit of the agreement. They do, however, provide a legal framework for action and put countries on record as being prepared to take certain measures in response to terrorism. They can also be used to publicize a country's noncompliance.

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National Law—The More Effective Response

The most effective legal measures to counter international terrorism have been national rather than international, and West Germany has been a leader in this effort. Such legislation makes the operational climate less hospitable for the terrorist by limiting, in specific circumstances, constitutional guarantees—such as freedom of speech, association, and movement—and by restricting access to counsel, bail, and speedy trial (table 3).

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[3] During 1973-80, terrorists averaged five skyjacking attempts per year. In 1981 a significant increase occurred, which was probably sparked by the successful Pakistan Liberation Army skyjacking in March and which reflected an increase in Latin American terrorist activity. In 1982, six terrorist skyjackings were attempted—a total comparable to the 1973-80 average.

Table 3
Selected European Countries: Key Provisions of National Legislation Used to Counter Terrorism [a]

	Austria	Belgium	France	Italy	Nether-lands	Spain	Switzer-land	United Kingdom	West Germany
Association with a terrorist deemed a criminal offense	CC	CC	A/EL	A/EL	CC	CC	CC	A/EL	A/EL
Advocacy of terrorist acts deemed a criminal offense	CC	CC	CC	A/EL	CC	CC	CC	CC	A/EL
Detention without formal charges for limited time	CC	CC	CC	A/EL	CC	CC	CC	A/EL	A/EL
Temporary restriction or ban on lawyer-client contact	None	A/EL	None	None	A/EL	None	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL
Monitor lawyer-client communication	CC	A/EL	CC	CC	A/EL	CC	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL
Interrogation without counsel present	PC	PC	PC	A/EL	PC	PC	PC	PC	PC
Exclusion of defense attorney from trial	PC	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL	PC	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL
Trial without defendant present	PC	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL	PC	A/EL	A/EL	A/EL

[a] Cited in general provisions of the national criminal code (CC) or the national procedural code (PC) or provided for by special antiterrorist/emergency legislation (A/EL).

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In 1968, in response to leftwing student violence, the FRG passed legislation that facilitated implementation of a "state of emergency," during which the federal government was empowered to:

- Enact legislation that would supersede existing state laws for the duration of the crisis.
- Deploy the Federal Border Guards throughout the states.
- Issue instructions that would be binding on federal administrative authorities and on otherwise independent state officials as well.

Laws were also passed that made it a criminal offense to support an act directed against the constitution or to encourage others to commit such acts. The penal code was amended in 1971 and again in 1975 to permit the police, prosecuting authority, or court to exclude a defense attorney from participating in a particular trial. The exclusion order may be issued by either the Higher Regional Court or the Federal Court of Justice, but not by the court hearing the case. Grounds for exclusion include suspicion of participating in an offense, aiding or abetting an offense, endangering the security of the state, or abusing the right of contact with an incarcerated client in order to commit an act that could compromise the security of the penitentiary.

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In 1977, in direct response to the RAF kidnaping and murder of German industrialist, Hanns-Martin Schleyer, Germany passed a law that provided for a two-week ban on contact between a prisoner and the outside world when such contact could facilitate terrorist operations. Such bans, which included visits from defense attorneys, could be extended up to one month if affirmed by judicial decree. In addition, since 1978 a lawyer and a terrorist client may be separated during consultations by use of a glass security barrier.

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The German penal code was also amended in response to early RAF hunger strikes to permit trial in the absence of the accused, if the accused is responsible for his inability to be present. Other provisions permit a trial to continue after the accused has been removed from the courtroom for disruptive behavior, provided he has been given an opportunity to plead the charge.

Since their inception, the German antiterrorist laws have been controversial. In 1975, the German Section of Amnesty International published an open letter to call attention to "the steadily worsening political climate in the Federal Republic," and the Reuters News Service reported that the International Commission of Jurists had criticized the government for endangering the rule of law. Of all the legislation, the contact ban law has drawn greatest fire, and the West German Lawyers' Association has urged its repeal. Some democratic Germans believe that such legislation could presage a return to totalitarianism. The statutes, however, have been carefully drawn and in our opinion judiciously applied.

Italy, too, has enacted tough antiterrorist legislation that permits search without warrant, detention up to 48 hours without charge, interrogation without counsel present, and holding an offender for up to five years before trial. After the Dozier kidnaping, authorities tightened prison regulations in an effort to sever channels of communications between Red Brigade members and jailed Brigade leaders. One of the most effective measures, passed in 1982 but since lapsed, provided reduced sentences for repentant terrorists. Although Italian authorities had obtained information through plea bargaining in the past, this law formalized such arrangements and provided a legal basis for fulfilling prior promises as well.

Outlook

We believe that terrorist exploitation of the international legal system will increase. Although precedent-setting courtroom victories remain unlikely, groups that have realized propaganda successes will probably refine their tactics to extract maximum political advantage. We expect them to concentrate on developing international support to increase their credibility and prestige with target audiences. The less sophisticated groups already attempting to exploit the system, albeit on a primitive level, most likely will emulate these efforts.

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We expect terrorist groups increasingly to bring their cases before international bodies such as the United Nations and Amnesty International. Even when the findings of these organizations do not favor the terrorist, the fact that terrorist groups are accorded a serious and respectful hearing, we believe, serves to increase their stature among potential adherents.

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We may also see greater manipulation of national legal processes by the overt political arm of terrorist groups in an effort to disrupt programs and policies of target governments. Such maneuvers could include legal action to enjoin governments from initiating defense-related projects, nuisance suits against key government officials, or attempts to exploit cases in litigation that involve social or environmental concerns. These actions may be taken solely for their propaganda value, with the aim of broadening the group's political constituency. Through exploitation of the legal system and other nonviolent tactics, terrorists can multiply their options, wage war at a variety of levels, and thereby become more difficult to neutralize.

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